There are three types of insider threat actors:

๐—จ๐—ป๐—ถ๐—ป๐˜๐—ฒ๐—ป๐˜๐—ถ๐—ผ๐—ป๐—ฎ๐—น โ€“ A user that is negligent, perhaps lacks the security awareness training or accidentally hard-codes a password.
๐— ๐—ฎ๐—น๐—ถ๐—ฐ๐—ถ๐—ผ๐˜‚๐˜€ โ€“ A user that intentionally performs a malicious act, this could be a current employee or contractor, a third-party vendor, or trusted entity.
๐—–๐—ผ๐—บ๐—ฝ๐—ฟ๐—ผ๐—บ๐—ถ๐˜€๐—ฒ๐—ฑ โ€“ This is when an actor has gained access to an employeeโ€™s (contractor, trusted entity) account and uses it to carry out the attack.

There are several types of insider threat attack vectors, privilege abuse/misuse, data mishandling, and other errors. About 80% of attacks are due to privilege misuse or using privileged access in an inappropriate way. That may sound like it was intentional, but it doesnโ€™t have to be. Think about a data engineer that uses an administrative account to move data in a test environment. The engineer mistakenly moves sensitive data to a public S3 bucket and doesnโ€™t realize it. If the engineer had used a โ€œtestโ€ account, there is a possibility that the engineer would have encountered an error and noticed before the breach occurred.

A staggering 56% of insider threats are due to employee negligence and could have been prevented, and the average cost is about $7.2M. To make matters worse, organizations that took longer than 90 days to contain the incident had costs of about $18M.

Letโ€™s look at indicators of compromise for insider threat, how can we identify it? Unfortunately, there isnโ€™t a magic tool and there is no single indicator, build your hypothesis and hunt. Keep in mind, there are only a small sampling:

๐—จ๐—ป๐˜‚๐˜€๐˜‚๐—ฎ๐—น ๐—น๐—ผ๐—ด๐—ถ๐—ป ๐—ฎ๐—ฐ๐˜๐—ถ๐˜ƒ๐—ถ๐˜๐˜† โ€“ There may be several attempts by a user that doesnโ€™t normally access a certain network share or other resource, suddenly their use increases. Maybe a user starts attempting access to a resource they donโ€™t have authorization to use.
๐—œ๐—ป๐˜€๐˜๐—ฎ๐—น๐—น๐—ถ๐—ป๐—ด ๐—ป๐—ฒ๐˜„ ๐˜๐—ผ๐—ผ๐—น๐˜€ ๐—ผ๐—ฟ ๐—ฎ๐—ฏ๐˜‚๐˜€๐—ถ๐—ป๐—ด ๐—ฐ๐˜‚๐—ฟ๐—ฟ๐—ฒ๐—ป๐˜ ๐˜๐—ผ๐—ผ๐—น๐˜€ โ€“ Suddenly a database administrator installs Windows Subsystem for Linux (WSL), which on its own wouldnโ€™t be too alarming. But an alert is raised showing a download of Kali WSL over top. Suppose an end user starts invoking MSHTA.exe with PowerShell.
๐—–๐—ผ๐—ฝ๐˜†๐—ถ๐—ป๐—ด, ๐—ฑ๐—ผ๐˜„๐—ป๐—น๐—ผ๐—ฎ๐—ฑ๐—ถ๐—ป๐—ด, ๐—ผ๐—ฟ ๐—ฑ๐—ฎ๐˜๐—ฎ ๐—บ๐—ผ๐˜ƒ๐—ฒ๐—บ๐—ฒ๐—ป๐˜ โ€“ A user begins copying sensitive data to a newly created network share or their endpoint device.

There are several ways insider threat can be reduced, but never completely mitigated. A robust security awareness program, secure coding awareness, RBAC, network and endpoint security solutions, and several more.

This blog was only meant to get you thinking about insider threat and what you can do to help prevent it. Remember to stay safe and keep hacking!

By Ghost40